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Introduction.
This paper is an exploration of some of the limits to freedom in family law imposed by 
society in terms of the recent debate surrounding homosexuality and marriage.  In 
particular, we consider the value of extending marriage rights to homosexuals, a very 
heated topic at present internationally.  It is well known that states such as Connecticut 
and California have faced local attempts to declare as unconstitutional the ban on 
homosexual marriage, which is reinforced federally by the Protection of Marriage Act 
1996.  Recently, President Bush has suggested an amendment to the Constitution making 
it absolutely clear that marriage is a social status reserved for heterosexuals. 
The question from an economic perspective is whether any useful purpose 
could be served by extending marriage rights to homosexuals.  Note that the marriage 
boundary has moved on previous occasions in common-law jurisdictions, notably in 
relation to the remarriage of divorcees and in relation to consanguinity.  It clearly differs 
between jurisdictions: Consider the difficulty internationally of recognizing polygamous 
marriages formed in Islamic jurisdictions.
2  The question of whether there is a case for a 
boundary movement, favoring homosexuals, must be related to an examination of the 
purpose of marriage more generally.  We therefore begin by briefly describing the life-
profile’ theory of marriage (Cohen 1987, 2002), considering whether this might apply to 
homosexuals.  We also report the results of a modest survey targeted at identifying 
asymmetric relationship-specific investments made by homosexuals.
2 The boundaries of all areas of law move over time: Consider the movement in tort law over 
professional negligence, or psychiatric injury of onlookers at accidents; or the history of consideration 
in contract law.
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Cohabitation and the Law
Homosexual cohabitation is a special case of heterosexual cohabitation, or even non-
sexual cohabitation.  Traditionally, the rights of cohabitants are governed by contract 
principles, following cases like Marvin,
3 although there is currently renewed interest in 
taking a status view of marriage (Ellman 2001).  A status view appears to underlie recent 
arguments in favor of extending the obligations of marriage to forms of cohabitation that 
approximate marriage, the key feature of which would be introducing the practices of a 
divorce court in settling up over property rather than allowing property rights to stand 
where they have arisen by work, inheritance, purchase, resulting and implicit trusts, or 
proprietary estoppel.   The nature of the debate may be seen in the proposals covering 
marital and (heterosexual) non-marital relationship breakdown contained in the American 
Law Institute's recent Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution,
4 which would 
effectively treat cohabitation as a form of marriage. 
The debate also surfaced recently in England in a Law Commission discussion 
paper that ultimately noted the difficulties of moving away from a traditional property-
rights approach towards the sharing of homes outside of marriage (Law Commission 
2002). The Commission began by addressing a case that many see as representing 
considerable injustice to cohabitants in long marriage-like relationships: The hard case, 
3 Marvin v. Marvin, 122 Cal. Rptr. 555 (App. 1981) (cohabiting parties upon separation have the 
obligations towards each other that they previously agreed upon).  See also Marone v. Marone, 429 N.Y.S. 
2d 592 (1980) (requiring express oral or written agreements) and Posik v. Posik, 695 So.2d 759 (Fla. 1997) 
(applying Marvin to same-sex couples).  A more recent case with Marvin characteristics and additional 
issues concerning business ownership is Maglica v. Maglica, 78 Cal. Reptr. 2d 101 (App. 1998). 
4 American Law Institute, Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution, Final Draft (2001).  The Principles
(e.g., section 5 on former spouses, and section 6 on cohabitees) emphasize several status-linked ideas.  
Cohabitation is to be assessed according to the extent to which it approximated marriage, ancillary relief 
follows a formulaic approach, and there is a strong presumption of equal property division (described by 
Ellman (2000) - the Chief Reporter - as appropriately viewed as an irrebuttable presumption in most cases).
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Burns,
5 in which, because of the emphasis on private property rights, a vulnerable 
claimant received no share of a family’s assets on dissolution.  Traditionally, the 
emphasis on private property rights, outside of marriage where a divorce court can 
subsequently reallocate assets, has affected all cohabitants regardless of sexuality.  The 
position has been mitigated in recent years by changes in the rules of organizations such 
as pension schemes and housing associations, and the domestic partnership laws 
introduced in many jurisdictions. The recent changes do support private ordering, but do 
not apply divorce-court rules to dissolution, and do not typically include cohabitants 
among protected persons under rules of inheritance.
6
Note that heterosexuals are not forced to cohabit.  Libertarian arguments can be 
made in favor of protecting the freedom to avoid marriage commitments (Dnes 2002).  
This view would claim that Burns, femme, should have known better: People do not just 
“end up places.”  Among the homosexuals, matters must be viewed differently because 
they are forced to cohabit; although consider the possibility of privately ordering living 
arrangements and dissolution obligations to approximate marriage.
7
Life Profiles: 'She Gave Him Her Best Years'
Lloyd Cohen (1987; 2002) has made a powerful argument that to avoid 
encouraging opportunistic divorce the equivalent of expectations damages should be 
awarded to the fault-free party in a divorce.  Cohen was particularly concerned with the 
fate of women leaving traditional marriages, for which modern 'no-fault' divorce law 
gives poor support.  His argument was based on a life-profile theory of marriage, 
5Burns v. Burns [1984] Ch.317; [1984] F.L.R. 216 C.A. (An unmarried mother was not entitled to a share 
of her cohabitant’s property in the absence of agreements to the contrary).  
6 The long-term partner of the late Nigel Hawthorne (The Madness of King George; Yes Minister) 
complained recently on BBC Radio that he had not only to cope with grief when the actor died, but also 
found difficulties in remaining housed owing to his tenuous position under inheritance laws.  
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characterized by an asymmetry over the timing of 'investments' made by the man and 
woman.  The woman invests in child raising and home building early on and expects, 
under a regime of fault-based divorce, to remain with her husband enjoying the family 
income and home over the long term.  He is freed of domestic responsibilities to build up 
a career that will yield high earnings later on in the life cycle. Cohen observed that males 
more readily remarry in middle age than can women: the life profiles show an asymmetry 
between the sexes.  The life-profile theory broadly implies that marriage may be a 
mechanism for protecting specific investments over time in the face of opportunism.
Marriages based on asymmetric investment patterns are subject to possible 'post-
contract opportunism', particularly after the introduction of no-fault divorce, which does 
not tie alimony and property division to fault.  It is now possible for the man to tire of an 
older wife and scoot off to a new relationship without maintaining the promised life style, 
providing courts do not require the payment of expectations-based settlements.  Divorce 
settlements based on meeting the needs of an ex-wife, as in American ‘equitable 
distribution’ states, may make divorce 'too cheap' and lead to such opportunism (Dnes 
1998) which is observed empirically.
8   Note also that a needs-based settlement culture, 
common in equitable-distribution common-law jurisdictions such as England or Virginia, 
could also make divorce too cheap from a female perspective. The wife might tire of 
marriage and may know that, in a moderate-asset setting, ‘needs’ could lead to her 
keeping a high proportion of the assets: Particularly as a parent with custody of minor 
7 Apparently some homosexuals have been forming partnerships under company law as a method of 
regulating the asset side of their relationships. 
8 The modern trend to introduce reliance (opportunity cost) or restitution (returning the value of domestic 
contributions) will also under compensate, as I explain in an earlier paper (Dnes 1998). Think of the low 
opportunity cost of a waitress who marries a millionaire, or the low market value of hosting and domestic 
management compared with a promised wealthy lifestyle.
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children. Casual empiricism suggests that the male variety of opportunism is more 
prevalent.
The legal regime affecting settlement can allow marriages to end even when, in terms 
of economics, they have been showing a surplus.  This inefficiency follows if one party 
can hold enough of the surplus under the legal rules to put that amount beyond 
bargaining.  Such indivisibilities explain why the Coase theorem may not apply to 
bargaining in the shadow of the divorce court to rearrange individual benefits and prevent 
divorce occurring when there is a positive overall benefit from the marriage.  The 
disruption of Coasian bargaining by divorce law changes is anyway implied by empirical 
results showing a significant and permanent shift in divorce rates following the 
introduction of no-fault divorce laws (Biner and Dnes, 2001).
9
Opportunistic divorce could not happen in a (contract) regime based on expectations 
damages and fault-based divorce, with fault interpreted as breach of contract.  Possibly, 
the parties will agree to divorce because the change will increase the welfare of one while 
the other has his or her welfare at least maintained.  Alternatively, one party will force a 
divorce but will be required to maintain the value of promises made to the other party, 
and would only do so in anticipation of being better off as a result. This reflection has 
caused Alan Parkman (2002) to argue in favor of what amounts to a specific performance 
requirement in marriage, i.e., the move to a regime allowing divorce but only by consent. 
If opportunistic divorce is known to be possible under a legal regime, it could 
destabilize marriage more generally: a spouse might avoid marriage if worried about 
opportunistic divorce later on.  The avoidance could take the form of delaying marriage 
to make a career investment that would act as self-insurance.
9 Bargaining may also be defeated by the presence of more naturally occurring indivisibilities such as 
children (Zelder 1993).  The argument that divorce rates may not change following legal reform because of 
bargaining adjustments is associated with Peters (1986).
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Cohabitation and the Life Profile Model
The move away from marriage and towards cohabitation represents a significant shift in 
social behaviour during the post-war period.  The trends for the 1960-2000 period are 
similar across many European countries and North America.
10   On average, first 
marriages fell from approximately 70 per 1000 to 30 per 1000 of the male population. 
The age at which first marriages occur has typically risen, with both men and women 
waiting an extra three years.  Births outside of marriage have increased from 5 per cent to 
35 per cent of all births. In addition, the proportion of cohabiting women between the 
ages of 20 and 50 has trebled. 
A puzzling aspect of the substitution is that cohabitation is against the interests of 
many women. Marriage is potentially a rather good mechanism for supporting long-term 
family investments, even taking a very approximate view of the fit of the life-profile 
model, and without marriage women might predict vulnerability to opportunistic 
behaviour (there might also be some men in such a position).  It seems unlikely that 
changes in women’s economic activity and in techniques of child rearing have reached a 
point where the sexes no longer show any asymmetric interdependence over life profiles.  
Therefore, one would expect a man’s willingness to offer marriage to remain a very 
important signal for young women, giving a ‘separating equilibrium’ distinguishing 
committed from uncommitted life partners.
11
 Cohabitation has not generally been subjected to the same kind of settling up 
regime as marriage in the event of dissolution.  Up to now there has been no equity-based 
10 See Kiernan (2002) and Brinig and Nock (2004).
11 There is a female equivalent: if divorce law did not support at-fault wives, their signal would be of 
willingness to bear dissolution costs if uncommitted in the long run.  
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intervention by a family court with powers to reallocate assets between partners or to 
create maintenance obligations.  Cohabiting parties must rely largely on natural >hostages=
that emerge in the relationship to limit the kind of opportunism described above. Such 
hostages may be provided by the presence of children, with whom a parent may wish to 
maintain easy contact.  Also, the search costs of finding a new partner, or any social 
stigma that might be attached to living alone, may act to hold people together over a long 
period of time.  In the case of marriage, the hostages will typically be bolstered by legal 
obligations between the ex-spouses to pay child and possibly spousal maintenance and to 
divide marital property according to statute and case law.
Note that recent moves towards treating cohabitation as marriage have led to 
child-support legislation imposing an obligation on all absent parents, regardless of 
marital status, to pay child support. Nonetheless, it is clear that it would be rational to 
choose to cohabit, if the parties actually wished to avoid, or perhaps in some jurisdictions 
just to lessen, the legal obligations towards each other in the event of termination.  One 
can conclude from research findings that, to the extent that people think they are ‘trying 
out’ partners (Lewis 1999) they are indeed avoiding marriage at that stage in their lives.
Quite apart from the imposition of status-neutral child support obligations, there 
have been more general moves towards public-policy authorities treating cohabitation as 
if it were de facto marriage.  At the beginning of this paper, we mentioned the ALI 
proposals that effectively give marital status to anything looking much like marriage, and 
the abortive attempt by the Law Commission in England to find rules for intervening in 
the established property rights (in the home) of parting cohabitants.
12  Even though the 
Law Commission failed to recommend changes, this was not because it eschewed 
12 Property rights may have changed during the relationship, if for example one partner promised a share in 
the house and the other relied on that promise, or one partner spent money on the other’s property.  This 
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intervention by the state in unmarried cohabitation, but rather because all the investigated 
ways of equitably redistributing property seemed to generate as many problems as were 
apparently solved.  The Commission spent some time considering whether it should be 
possible to balance off contributions to home life (perhaps A’s paying food bills) against 
payments for the home (B as legal owner pays the mortgage).  It noted that people often 
have received accommodation benefits that would need to be deducted from any capital 
value claimed and that courts might wish to treat the impact of work done and payments 
made differently depending on who made the contributions and the reasons behind their 
efforts (Law Commission 2002, 56).   There certainly are problems in getting a scheme to 
work. What should we do if rents were high for the period during which a deduction is 
calculated and capital values have since fallen: Would A then owe B money?  
From a life-profile perspective, if there were evidence that women were making 
early investments in family life in the expectation of lifetime support (a traditional model) 
and that men were taking advantage of them by imposing cohabitation rather than 
marriage, there would be the basis for a claim of exploitation.  Policy might then 
reasonably seek to outlaw cohabitation by turning it effectively into marriage.  Such 
reasoning might cause marriage-like obligations to be enforced when cohabitation came 
to approximate marriage (e.g. after children have been born within the union, or after a 
period of time during which one party has been economically dependent).   However such 
a claim of opportunistic or exploitative cohabitation is not supported by the evidence 
(Lewis 1999) which appears to suggest a run up to marriage rather than a perception of 
common-law marriage,
13 and at best one could claim that some women and men may be 
misinformed about the likely outcome of cohabitation and the life-profile problem. In that 
kind of trust and estoppel based considerations apply to the range of proprietary interests, including property 
in marriage, property shared by cohabiting relatives, or by cohabiting same-sex partners.  
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case there might be a case for providing information and education but hardly one for 
banning a consensual practice.  The key issue here is that parties are free to avoid 
cohabitation as they could choose marriage.
Same-sex Cohabitation.
 Jurisdictions in Canada and America (such as Hawaii and Vermont) and - outside 
of the common-law world - others like Denmark and Belgium, have instigated ‘domestic 
partnership’ contracts carrying many of the obligations of marriage.  There have also 
been recent moves, particularly in California, Connecticut and New York, to legitimize 
homosexual marriage, as mentioned at the beginning of this article.  Much pressure to 
recognize same-sex unions within the EU has come from the incorporation into national 
law of Articles 12 (the right to marry) and 8 (respect for privacy and family life) of the 
European Convention on Human Rights. However, the Netherlands is the only 
jurisdiction so far to have fully extended marriage to same-sex couples, within a system 
characterized by a formidable array of legal models for marriage and cohabitation. 
The issues of property rights connected to same-sex unions are substantially the 
same as those in heterosexual unions, with the difference that heterosexuals have 
traditionally had a choice over whether to marry, whereas homosexuals have had no 
choice but to cohabit.  The growth of a debate over extending marriage or domestic 
partnerships serves to cast some of the property-rights issues affecting traditional 
marriage partners into sharp relief.  There is a related question whether extending 
marriage rights to homosexuals (or, for that matter, transsexuals) would serve any 
function. 
The thrust of the life-profile theory of marriage is that the enforcement of long-
term support promises protects specific investments by the economically vulnerable 
13 Common law marriage (i.e. an informal claim by a couple to be married) is recognized in some American 
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spouse thereby creating confidence that commitment is genuine.  Marriage enables a man 
and woman to plan their lives and to avoid turning a sexual asymmetry into th e basis for 
exploitation of the weaker party.  On this reasoning it would make sense to extend the 
status of marriage to homosexual partners if there were evidence of the same life-profile 
issues that affect heterosexuals.  Given the same-sex nature of the relationships it does 
not seem likely that such asymmetries would arise and at first sight it would seem that the 
life-profile approach does not support same-sex marriage.  It would appear that the 
Hawaiian approach of enabling domestic partnership registration, really as a basis for 
defining pension and similar rights, could meet the functional needs of homosexual 
cohabitants.
In the recent interesting case of Wayling v. Jones
14 a homosexual cohabitant 
worked for many years in the expectation of eventually inheriting the hotel he helped to 
develop.  In many ways, the case mirrors the canonical heterosexual life-profile case of 
the young woman investing in a home and family on the understanding of sharing the 
fruits of her husband’s career development.  There are differences however in that the 
expectation of inheritance was dealt with adequately in Wayling by the application of 
normal proprietary estoppel principles, i.e. by applying equity principles that would affect 
all persons married or otherwise.  Care must be taken: just because it seems likely that the 
specific investments (sunk costs) made in same-sex unions will be quantifiable and will 
tend to register on the standard land law concerning trusts and estoppel, it does not mean 
that we can rule out the life-profile asymmetry that is of such concern in considering 
heterosexual marriage. There may be some, even just a very small number, of 
homosexual cohabitants who can produce the same life-profile issues affecting 
heterosexuals.
states such as Montana.
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Extending the choice of whether to marry or cohabit does not force homosexuals 
into same-sex marriage.  It does give a party to a relationship the opportunity to insist on 
marriage to protect sunk investment if in that party’s estimation the protection of 
marriage laws is needed. Thus if two women live together and one develops a career 
while the other builds the home, the possibility of a divorce settlement if the relationship 
were later dissolved would provide a credible signal of long term commitment to the 
economically more vulnerable woman.  Indeed, with adoption of children or the use of 
artificial insemination it is possible to imagine the duplication of most of the 
characteristics of a traditional marriage.  Making marriage available is like using a 
property rule (Ayres and Goldbart, 2003) to deal with nuisance - we do not know in 
advance whether a party will need the legal entitlement to make certain costs register with 
other parties but in the right circumstances the entitlement will support an efficient 
bargaining soluti on.
15
Life Profiles: Some Preliminary Results.
We now report on a preliminary survey of a sample of 100 homosexual couples 
to ascertain whether their life profiles showed anything like the same asymmetric pattern 
as the one suggested for traditional marriage among heterosexuals.
16  Generally, the 
results support a substantially egalitarian, rather than asymmetric, pattern of inputs to 
cohabitation – with little childrearing or partner-support activities occurring.  The results 
are summarized in the table.
14 (1993) 69 P.&C.R. 179; [1995] 2 F.L.R. 1029.
15A property rule refers to an approach such as enjoining a nuisance that effectively gives the victim a 
property right in stopping the nuisance, forcing the tortfeasor to obtain permission for the nuisance if it is to 
continue (probably by paying compensation for losses).
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Table: Homosexual Cohabitants and Life Profiles (% Reported or Agreeing)
Partner Stays Income Disparity Children Career
Home >20% Own Adopted Impediment
No 95 80  7  2 90
Yes   5 20 93 98 10
(Sample: N=100; male = 82; female = 18)
There is little evidence in the table for similarity between homosexual 
cohabitation and the traditional model of marrital asymmetric dependency that gives a 
functional reason for marriage.  Very few cohabitants appear to give up their careers to 
invest in home making, and there is almost no adoption of children.  Where there are 
children, they tend to have come from a cohabitant’s former heterosexual relationship. 
Income equality is dominantly recorded and few cohabitants thought their relationship an 
impediment to career progress.  One would expect a heterosexual cohabitant to deviate 
from a traditional norm these days, but not to such a marked extent.  
The fact that very few homosexual cohabitants fit a pattern needing marriage does 
not mean that homosexual marriage can be instantly dismissed. That just a few people 
might suffer a form of exploitation does not make it desirable, from the perspective of 
either welfare economics or ethics, to ignore the problem.  However, if these preliminary 
results carry over to a larger sample, they would suggest examining alternatives to 
marriage as mechanisms for protecting vulnerable cohabitants, particularly if homosexual 
marriage carried major externalities for the wider population. The externalities do seem to 
be present, given the vociferous opposition to which President Bush has given voice.      
16 The sample was constructed by a snowball technique. Initial contacts being made through a gay and 
Lesbian association based on the south coast of England.   
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press14
Conclusions
Marriage is potentially useful in all cohabitation settings where asymmetry in life-
profiles can be detected, but as an option for the parties to choose for themselves.  The 
range of cohabitation settings is quite extensive and includes same-sex cohabitation.  
Public policy moves to turn heterosexual cohabitation into marriage need to be treated 
with extreme caution, whereas the extension of the possibility of marriage to same-sex 
couples might be welfare enhancing for the small numbers for whom it may be relevant.  
Broadly, life-profile theory implies sustaining a choice between informed cohabitation 
and marriage. 
However, if homosexual marriage creates a great deal of discomfort among the 
wider population, the small number of likely victims of opportunistic behavior within the 
community of homosexual cohabitants would suggest examining alternatives to marriage.  
Perhaps homosexual couples who adopt children, or who otherwise recognizably 
disadvantage one of the cohabitants, could be required to write dissolution agreements 
covering the support of weaker party in the event of dissolution. Alternatively, divorce-
court jurisdiction could be extended to cohabitants who are unable to marry and show the 
asymmetry that seems to indicate a need for ex-post regulation.
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